Michigan Law Review
Volume 48

Issue 8

1950

EQUITY-INJUNCTION-NONCONFORMANCE OF LUSTRON HOUSE
TO BUILDING RESTRICTIONS
Stephen A. Bryant S.Ed.
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons

Recommended Citation
Stephen A. Bryant S.Ed., EQUITY-INJUNCTION-NONCONFORMANCE OF LUSTRON HOUSE TO BUILDING
RESTRICTIONS, 48 MICH. L. REV. 1201 (1950).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol48/iss8/18

This Regular Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1950]

R.EcENT DECISIONS

1201

EQmTY-lNJUNCTION-NONCONPORMANCB oF LusmoN HousB TO BUILDING
REsTRICTIONs-Plaintiffs, as landowners in a restricted Detroit subdivision, sought
to restrain the defendants from erecting a Lustron house in violation of restrictions
limiting construction to full basement, one-family dwellings, costing a minimum
of $6,000 and composed of brick, brick veneer, hollow tile or stucco. These restrictions were imposed on all lots in the subdivision by the original owner in
1925. The Lustron house, although costing approximately $7,500, had no basement and was constructed entirely of steel.1 After agreeing to remove it should
the court enforce the restrictions, defendants erected the house.2 On appeal from
a decree granting an injunction, held, affirmed by an equally divided court. Evergreen Village Civic Assn. v. Oak.born, Inc., 327 Mich. 161 (1950).
Decisions in cases involving restrictive covenants re8ect a conffict between two
strong policies in the law: one against restrictions on the use and enjoyment of a
fee, and the other encouraging the development of residential areas. The result
has been a series of seemingly inconsistent rules from a policy standpoint. Thus,
the courts will construe a restrictive covenant most !;trongly against the party seeking to enforce it, 3 but at the same time will not require him to show that he will be
damaged if relief is denied.4 Similarly, the plain language of a covenant will not
be broadened by construction to give effect to the intent with which it was imposed;5 neither will the court limit the scope of the covenant unless it can be shown
that a radical change of conditions has rendered enforcement futile. 6 The princi-

1 Principal case, Record on Appeal, p. 59.
2Jd. at 62.
S Woodward Hills Impr. Assn. v. Carey Homes, Inc., 321 Mich. 163 at 165, 32 N.W.
(2d) 428 (1948); Gardner v. Maffitt, 335 Mo. 959, 74 S.W. (2d) 604 (1934); Jernigan v.
Capps, 187 Va. 73, 45 S.E. (2d) 886 (1948); Lawson v. Lewis, 205 Ga. 227, 52 S.E. (2d)
859 (1949). But s'ee Hoover v. Waggoman, 52 N.M. 371, 199 P. (2d) 991 (1948) noted
in 47 MicH. L. REv. 1029 (1949).
4 Cases cited in 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., §858 (1939); 14 AM. ]UR., Cove;nants §339 (1938).
5 Moore v. Kimball, 291 Mich. 455 at 460-461, 289 N.W. 213 (1939); Davidson v.
Sohier, 220 Mass. 270, 107 N.E. 958 (1915).
6 Carey v. Lauhoff, 301 Mich. 168, 3 N.W. (2d) 67 (1942); Rombauer v. Compton
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pal case furnishes an excellent illustration of the problem. Half of the court,
·while recognizing that relief will be denied where the plaintiff is estopped by his
conduct or the purpose of the restriction has failed, could not bring the case within
any of the "regular channels of non-enforcement" and wei:e therefore of the
opinion that the injunction was properly granted.7 The other four justices were
willing to declare the restrictions obsolete "so far as the rights and interests of the
parties to the cause are concerned."8 In reaching the latter conclusion the justices
were influenced by such varying considerations as the fact that the subdivision
had been slow to develop; the refusal of the FHA to loan money under the existing
restrictions; the Willingness of a majority of the lot-owne;s to modify them; the
change over twenty-five years in standards of construction; and the obsolescence
· of a cost restriction based on the purchasing power of the 1925 dollar. 9 Although
equity has denied an injunction on the ground of obsolescence, the courts have
required a clear showing that enforcement of the restriction would no longer result
in any substantial benefit to the plaintiff.10 In the principal case, whether the
restriction was imposed with the general purpose of developing a substantial and
sanitary neighborhood, or specifically to provide for nothing but brick, stucco and
hollow tile homes, it seems clear that the purpose of the restriction has not "failed"
in the sense that the restrictions are no longer of any benefit to those who have
built their homes in the ~ubdivision. It may be argued, however, that although
the restrictions are not obsolete, the Lustron house, made of steel, does not violate
their purpose. Although the writer feels that there is much force in this argument,
the trend of recent decisions is against any deviation from the unambiguous terms
of a restriction, either in fayor of the covenantee or the covenantor. These authorities indicate that if there is a literal compliance with the terms of the restriction,
the covenantor will not be restrained, though his conduct frustrates the purpose of
the restriction. Thus, several cases have held that the effect of an inflationary
economy upon a minimum cost requirement does not justify a_n upward revision
of the restriction.11 Yet it has also been held that the covenantee can insist on
literal compliance with the restriction although the threatened conduct would not
Heights Christian Church, 328 Mo. 1, 40 S.W. (2d) 545 (1931); Alamogordo Impr. Co. v.
Prendergast, 45 N.M. 40, 109 P. (2d) 254 (1942); Deitrick v. Leadbetter, 175 Va. 170, 8
S.E. (2d) 276 (1940).
7 Principal case at 165, opinion of Justice Sharpe.
8 Principal case at 161, opinion of Justice Reid.
9 In a similar Illinois case where 1926 restrictions limited

.
construction to three-apartment
brick buildings, the court refused to modify them to permit the erection of one-family dwellings, even though only one building had ever been erected under the restrictions, the government was willing to finance one-family homes, many lots were in default on special assessments,
and no prospects for further apartment buildings were in view. Ockenga v. Alken, 314 ill.
App. 389, 41 N.E. (2d) 548 (1942).
.
10 Carey v. Lauhoff, supra, note 6, at 172. Cases are collected in 54 A.L.R. 812 (1928)
and 85 A.L.R. 985 (1933).
11 Cases collected in 161 A.L.R. 1131 (1946). See also Moore v. Kimball, supra, note
5, at 461. The court said that where the language of the restriction is unambiguous, "it must
be considered without regard to extraneous facts: • • • [T]he terms of the restrictions are
conclusive."
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violate its purpose. In a striking New Jersey case the chancellor restrained a
minor breach of a cost restriction which was caused solely because the defendant
had erected twenty-five homes and brought the average cost below the minimum
through savings by quantity purchases.12 The situation is unhealthy. Equity is
striving so mightily to give simultaneous effect to policies against limiting the free
use of land and in favor of the development of purely residential areas in an industrialized society, that equitable relief is tending toward inflexibility. It is not
enough to say that the unambiguous language of a restriction must be applied
literally or not at all. The very fact that individuals impose restrictions on the
use of land to accomplish special purposes in particular situations creates a need
for a flexible system of enforcement to maintain a reasonable relation between the
language used and the effect which it was intended to have. At least one court
has recognized this problem and has denied a petition seeking complete nullification of a restriction, while strongly indicating that it would not regard the petitioner's proposed action as a breach of the covenant13 Whether it is called a
contract right or a property interest, it is apparent that the benefit of a restrictive
covenant arises only as equity is willing to enforce it14 In view of this fact, serious
objection could not be made if equity should choose to grant or withhold enforcement only after inquiry as to the purpose of the restriction and as to whether that
purpose is threatened.
Stephen A. Bryant, S.Ecl.

12 McComb v. Hanly, 128 N.J. ·Eq. 316, 16 A. (2d) 74 (1940); revd. on other grounds
in 132 N.J. Eq. 182, 26 A. (2d) 891 (1942).
13 Fidelity Title & Trust Co. v. Loomis & Nettleton Co., 125 Conn. 373, 5 A. (2d) 700
(1939).
14 4 PoMBROY, EQUITY JumsPRUDBNCE, 4th ed.,§ 1693 (1919).

